There are a lot of movies and videos made related to the world of Space and Technology. I watched a movie ‘Apollo 13’ in which the Service Module on the Apollo shuttle was planned to give the majority of the consumables, for example, oxygen, water, and power for the mission. It was additionally intended to fill in as the essential impetus and moving arrangement of the shuttle. The blast of the oxygen tank, anyway led to the loss of the consumables and rendered the service module nonfunctional . The Service Module was retained until just before re-entry to protect the command module heat shield from the possible degrading effects of long exposure to the cold of space and the second one was the Lunar Module. It was intended to be utilized just to make the arrival on the Moon and giving a working base and living quarters while superficially. On this mission, be that as it may, it went about as a “raft.” With its different frameworks for power and consumables, it enabled the team to safeguard the order module supplies for re-entry activities. Additionally, as the Service module could never again give impetus, the Lunar Module plummet motor was utilized to play out the moves important to adjust the shuttle direction for the arrival to the Earth. The Apollo 13 glitch was brought about by a blast and break of oxygen tank no. 2 in the Service module. The blast burst a line or harmed a valve in the no. 1 oxygen tank, making it lose oxygen quickly. The Service module straight no.4 cover was passed over. All oxygen stores were lost inside around 3 hours, alongside loss of water, electrical power, and utilization of the impetus framework. The oxygen tanks had initially been intended to keep running off the 28 volt DC intensity of the direction and administration modules. Be that as it may, the tanks were overhauled to likewise keep running off the 65 volt DC ground control at Kennedy Space Center. All segments were moved up to acknowledge 65 volts aside from the radiator thermostatic switches, which were ignored. These changes were intended to open and kill the radiator when the tank temperature achieved 80 degrees F. (Typical temperatures in the tank were – 300 to – 100 F.). During pre-flight testing, tank no. 2 indicated irregularities and would not void effectively, perhaps because of the harmed fill line. (On the ground, the tanks were discharged by driving oxygen gas into the tank and compelling the fluid oxygen out, in space there was no compelling reason to exhaust the tanks.) The warmers in the tanks were regularly utilized for brief periods to warm the inside marginally, expanding the strain to keep the oxygen streaming. It was chosen to utilize the radiator to “bubble off” the abundance oxygen, requiring 8 hours of 65 volt DC control. This most likely harmed the thermostatically controlled switches on the radiator, intended for just 28 volts. It is trusted the switches welded close, enabling the temperature inside the tank to ascend to more than 1000 degrees F. The checks estimating the temperature inside the tank were intended to gauge just to 80 F, so the extraordinary warming was not taken note. The high temperature exhausted the tank, yet in addition brought about genuine harm to the teflon protection on the electrical wires to the power fans inside the tank. The uncovered fan wires shorted and the teflon protection burst into flames in the unadulterated oxygen condition. This fire quickly warmed and expanded the weight of the oxygen inside the tank, and may have spread along the wires to the electrical channel in the side of the tank, which debilitated and burst under the weight, causing the no. 2 oxygen tank to detonate. This harmed the no. 1 tank and parts of the inside of the Service module and passed over the cover no.
So in my opinion these technologies were not accurate as